Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1949

James C. Whittaker v. Richard H. Spencer : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Elias Hansen; Allan G. Thurman; Attorneys for defendants and appellants.
J. Vernon Erickson; Dilworth Woolley; Attorney for Plaintiff .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, James C. Whittaker v. Richard H. Spencer, No. 19497181.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/24

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTA -1
DOCUM:NT
KFU

UT/\H SUPREME COURT
BRIEF:

45.9

~gCKET NO. 11~ I- fl.-

vs.
RICHARD H. SPENCER, (in whose
name RICHARD LEO SPENCER, as
Administrator has been substituted,
JOHN EDISON SPENCER, ELIZABETH A. TIBBS, VORD SPENCER,
mWIN M. PBIOE, SIMON RUGENTOBLER, (in whose place Que Jensen
has been substituted), INDIANOLA
mBIGATION COMPANY and the
STATE OF UTAH,
Def~.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JAMES C. WffiTTAKEB
APPEAI®D FRO!l THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOB SANPmE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
JOHN A. HOUGA ABD, JUDGE

EI•TAS HANSEN
.A.~

for

J o"H EtJ.is0t1

de~

8pet~Cer

Gild GfJpelbau
Mid Eu.abei'A .A.. Tilh

AIJ,AN G. THOBMAN
.A.ttomey for tkfvmtlo,nt afld ~~

Bic'hord Leo Spet&Cer, .A.dmitNstf'attof'
J. VERNON ERICKSON
DILWORTH WOOLLEY
.A.flonlegs for PlaMtti"
JENSEN & JENSEN

.A.Uomeys for defeftdatnt tJnd Cf'oss oomp,.,_,,
lfllllianokl lf'f"igaMtm Com'fXM1}

JOHN S. McAI,I,ISTEB
.A.ttonaeg for defvmtlo,nt Que J 6ff86fJ.

INDEX
Page
TOPICS
I. STATEMENT OF THE: FACTS......................................................
1
II. ARGUME:NT ........................................................................................ 13
I. Price's Affidavit ...................................................................... 13
II. Whittaker's Right Not Lost.................................................. 15
III. Appellants Are Estopped...................................................... 17
(a) By Mortgage .................................................................. 17
(b) By Disclaimers ................................................................ 19
(c) By Record and Judgment.............................................. 20
IV. 'Res Adjudicata ........................................................................ 24
V. Hadlock's Mortgage not Void; Not Uncertain.................... 29
VI. The Judgment is Correct.......................................................... 46
VII. Costs Properly Allowed.......................................................... 4 7
STATUTES
Section 100-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 19'43........................................ 15
78-1-13 ·································································································· 18
78-1-11 ·································································································· 18
Compiled Laws, Utah, 1888, Vol. II, page 135.................................... 41
Section 100-1-2, Code.................................................................................. 41
104-44-2 ································································································ 48
104-44-4 ································································································ 48
TEX~S

21
21
15
21
34
34
34
34
34
34
67

G.J. 1067, Section 26............................................................................
G.J. 1068, Section 27............................................................................
C.J. 1230, Section 40............................................................................
C.J. 1063, Section 21............................................................................
G.J. 511, Section 81,5............................................................................
C.J. 859, Section 1262..........................................................................
G.J. 944, Section 1345..........................................................................
C.J. 962, Section 13B8..........................................................................
C.J. 984, Section 1405..........................................................................
C.J. 742, Section 1154..........................................................................
C.J. 1038, Section 479..........................................................................
1039, Section 481................................................................................
1040, Section 481................................................................................
1041, Section 486................................................................................
1079, Section 557 .............. ------------------·-···············--·-···························
36 Am. Juris., Section 42..........................................................................
11 G.J. 464, Section 84 (2)........................................................................

17
17
16
20
21
21
2'2
22
23
25
31
31
31
31
31
32
39

GASES
Elliott v. Whitmore, 8 Utah 254, 30 P. 984........................................ 42
Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P. (2d) 894............................ 15
Jacobsen v. Christiansen, 18 Utah 149, 55 P. ,562............................ 38
Logan City v. Utah Bower & 'Light Co., 86 U. 340, 16 P. (2d) 1079 26
Middle Gut Ditch Co. v. Henry, 15 Mont. 558, 39 P. 1054................ 43
Nephi lrrig. Co. v. Vickers, 15 U. 374, 49 P. 301............................ 42
Payton v. Browning, (N.M.), 290 Pack 253........................................ 33
Smith v. Phillips, 6 U. 376, 23 P. 932.................................................... 42
Sharp v. Whitmore, 51 U. 14, 168 P. 273................................................ 43
Wick v. Rea, 54 Wash. 424, 427, 103 Pac. 462...................................... 21

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah
JAMES C. WHITTAKER,
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vs.
RICHARD H. SPENCER, (in whose
name RICHARD LEO SPENCER, as
Administrator has been substituted,
JOHN EDISON SPENCER, ELIZABETH A. TIBBS, VORD SPENCER,
IRWIN M. PRICE, SIMON HUGEN'TOBLER, (in whose place Quo Jensen
has been substituted, INDIANOLA
IHRIGATION COMPANY and tho
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants.

Case No.

7181

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
.JAMES C. WHITTAKER

Sri'ATEMI<~NT

OF THE FACTS

The controlling facts so far as they relate to the
plaintiff's side of the case are not in dispute. They are
for the most part matters of record. If tho mortgage
under which plaintiff claims is valid, the record shows
beyond all question that the plaintiff has a perfectly
good title to the 60 acres of primary or class A water
right in 'Thistle creek and its tributaries which he claims.
It also shows that both appellants are estopped by mort-

2
gage, by their disclaimers and by judgment to raise the
question of the validity of the mortgage and that the
validity of the mortgage is a matter which has been
determined by the judgment of the court in case No.
2888.
The plaintiff's title is based upon a mortgage which
was given by Richard H. Spencer to W. H. Hadlock, the
state bank commissioner, and which was foreclosed in
case No. 2888. This mortgage is plaintiff's Exhibit E.
(1'r. 26, 37).
rl'he waters of Thistle creek were appropriated by
diversion and beneficial use many years ago. There was
a decree rendered in the district court at Provo in Territorial days which settled the rights of the appropriators as of that time. rl'lten in l!J20 there was another decree rendered in the di:,;trict court in Sanpete county,
Utah, again adjudicating those same water rights. 1'his
decree is copied in the cornplaint an<l also in the findings of facts. The ease in whieh that decree was rendered hears the numher 140G. (See Findings of Facts.)

It was decreed in ease No. HOG that Richard H.
Spencer was then the owner o[ the right to the use of
448 acres of primary or class A right out of a total of
1728 such rights on the stream, and that his water right
had not then heen conveyed to the Indianola Irrigation
Company, a corporation, as many of these rights had
been, and that there were no stock certificates outstanding for the Richard H. Spencer rights. (See Finclings
of Facts.)
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The evidence shows that there were only 1728 acres
of land under irrigation in Thistle Valley; and in ease
No. 1406 the court decreed that these 1728 acres of
primary or class A rights embraced all the waters of
tho stream. But there were also class B rights, which,
however, can be used only from the beginning of the irrigation season to June 15, while tho high waters are
flowing in the stream. (Tr. 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170,
171,172,173,174)
The evidence also shows that it has always been
customary for the water users to take all the water they
need or can use for their lands while the stream is high;
but as the flow diminishes they use fewer ditches, combine the stream flow, and take their water in turns. It
has been customary ever since the organization of the
Indianola Irrigation Company, in 1918, for the water
master of the corporation each year to make out tickets
for all the water users, both those who had conveyed
their rights to the corporation taking stock certificates
as evidence of their rights as well as those who had not
so conveyed their rights and had no stock certificates
in the corporation, showing when each owner's turns
commenced and ended. ( Tr. 165-175)
Tho evidence also shows that no land owner was
obliged to use his water right on any particular land.
On the contrary, he had the right to and did irrigate any
land from any ditch according to his own desires, transferring from land to land and from ditch to ditch at will.
(Tr. 165-175, 177,789, 159)
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Many years ago Richard H. Spencer acquired from
their Indian owners four tracts of land or farms. They
are:
(1) The Jim Ownup or Old Jim land, being
SE% of Section 8, containing 160 acres.
(2) The Wapitch farm, being S1;2NE1)!, and
NYzSE% of Section 5, containing 160 acres.

(3) The Wansitz farm, being Slj2 NW14 and
NYzSW%, Section 5, containing 160 acres.
( 4) The Ponawats farm, being Lot 4 of Section

5 and Lot 1 of Section 6, containing 77 acres.
( 5) Richard H. Spencer also owned a ci,ty lot in
Indianola containing 3 acres.
It appears from the testimony of Lyman H. Seely
that when the decree was entered in case No. 1406 Richard H. Spencer was a'llowed water rights of the primary or Class A description for these lands as follows:

160
70
160
55
3

acres
acres
acres
acres
acres

on
on
on
on
on

the
the
the
the
the

Jim Ownup farm.
Wapitch farm.
Wansitz farm.
Ponawats farm.
lot in town.

448 acres.

(Tr. 360-365)
But it should be remembered that he had the right
to use this water upon any of his land and that he did
in fact sometimes use it all on one tract or another and
that when the stream was at low flow he combined his
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water into one or two ditches and used it wherever on
any of the land as needed. 'rhe evidence also shows that
the 3 acres allocated to the city lot had been used on
the vVapitch land and had never been used on the lot
in town. Seely also testified that in the decree in No.
140G Spencer had been allocated only 55 acres for the
Ponawats farm, that this farm had used 80 acres of
water right but before that decree was entered Spencer
had sold and conveyed 25 acres of that water right to
one vVall, so that when the decree was made Spencer was
allocated only 55 acres of primary right for the 77
acres in the Ponawa ts farm. ( Tr. 360-365)
The evidence concerning Richard H. Spencer's mortgages and deeds of transfer of his 448 acres of primary
or Class A rights comes from the records in the office
of the county recorder. The deeds and mortgages with
which the plaintiff is concerned, with their dates and the
dates of record, are as follows:
First:

The HugentObler mortgage.

This mortgage is dated January 5, 1922; it is recorded as of January 12, 1922. It runs from Richard
H. Spencer and his wife to Simon Hugentobler. It covers
the land in the Ponawats farm and 55 acres of primary
or class A water right in 'Thistle creek.
'l1 he mortgage itself does not state whether or not

the water right mortgaged is water right used for the
irrigation of the mortgaged land. In fact, so far as the
terms of the mortgage are concerned, it cannot be de-
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termined whether or not there is any of the land which
has ever been irrigated.
Second: The Federal Building and Loan Association mortgage.
This mortgage is dated November 9, 1926. It was recorded November 9, 1926. It runs from Hichard H. Spencer to the Federal Building and Loan Association. It
covers the .Jim Ownup 160 acres of land in Section 8 and
parts of the vVapitch lands in Section 5, and 285 acres
of primary water rights. It also appears in connection
with this transaction that Richard H. Spencer purported
to assign to Federal Building and Loan Association
285 shares of Class A stock in the Indianola Irrigation
Company. But it must be remembered that at this time
Richard H. Spencer owned no shares of stock in that
corporation representing any of the water rights with
this action is concerned, namely the 448 acres of right
clecree<l to him in ease No. l40G, all(l that there was
then no certificate outstanding for any of those rights.
'l'hird:

The Hadlock mortgage.

This mortgage is dated October 16, 1931, and was
recorded October 21, 1931. It is executed by Hichard
H. Spencer and others and rnns to vV. H. Hadlock, the
state hank commissioner. It is witnessed and notarized
hy \Vill L. Hoyt. It is in the statutory form of mortgages
in use in this state. It covers 280 acres of land in Section :3, with the water right used thereon, and contains
this speeial paragraph relative to the water right which
the plaintiff now claims:
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"Tog-ether with all rights of en ry kind and
nature, however evi<lenced, to the use of water,
ditches, and canals for tile inigation of said
premises to which the mortgag·ors or said premises are now or may hereafter become entitled;
whether represented by certificates of' stock or
otherwise, and together with sixty (60) shares
or acres of water right owned by H. H. Spencer
in the waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle Creek
and Hock Creeks in addition to waters now used
for the irrigation of the above described lands."
(Tr. 26)
The astonishing suggestion is advanced by counsel
for appellants that this mortgage might have been intended by the parties to be a second mortgage on Richard H. Spencer's 60 acres of primary water right. But it
is to be noted that there is nothing whatever in the instrument itself nor is there any evidence in the record
to support such suggestion.
The evidence shows, without dispute or conflict that
the only water right which the bank commissioner obtained as security by this mortgage is the 60 acres belonging to Richard H. Spencer. The water right which
had been decreed in connection with the land in Section
3 was then owned by one of the other mortgagors, there
was a stock certificate in the Indianola Irrigation Company then outstanding to represent the same, and the
bank commissioner did not receive possession of said
certificate; but it was later pledged to a bank in Spanish Fork, the pledge was foreclosed, and the stock at the
time of the trial was owned by 'l'anner. (Tr. 390, 393)
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The total number of acres or shares of the primary
or class A water rights covered by the three mortgages
above mentioned is 400, leaving, as of October 16, 1931,
the date of the Hadlock mortgage, 48 acres out of Richard H. Spencer's 448 acres sti'll in his name and free
from mortgage or other lien.
Now, please hear in mind that not until November
25, 1931, had Richard H. Spencer conveyed any of his
448 acres to the Indianola Irrigation Company; and not
until that day did he have any certificate of stock in that
corporation to represent any of his water right. Also
please bear in mind the fact that all of the mortgages
above mentioned were executed and recorded prior to
the date of any other instrument involved in this action
affecting the 448 acres of primary water right of Richard H. Spencer's.
Fourth: The deed to Indianola Irrigation Company.
'There is a dispute concerning the date of the execution of this deed. Appellants claim it was signed on June
1, 1D18, or .June 21, l!H8. rrlte evidence shows that it
was signed by Richard H. Spencer and his wife on November 25, 1931, which is the date when they signed the
separate slip of paper which is attached to the instrument. The court found as a fact in case No. 2888 and
also in this case that Richard H. Spencer signed that
slip of paper on November 25, 1931.
But he the fact as it may as to when they executed
this deed, the fact is beyond all question that it was not
recorded until April4, 1936.
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So that the three mortgages above mentioned take
priority over this deed.
This deed purports to convey to the Indianola Irrigation Company HiO acres of primary water right; and
upon the basis of this deed the irrigation company issued a certificate for HiO shares of its class A stock,
which was afterward surrendered to the corporation
and cancelled and in lieu thereof certificates 72 and
73 were issued.
Fifth : The Federal Building and Loan mortgage
is foreclosed.
The next step involving Spencer's 448 acres of water
rights which is important is the foreclosure of the Federal Building and Loan Association mortgage. 'This
was done in case No. 2730.
Federal became the purchaser at the foreclosure sale
of the land and water rights described in its mortgage.
Federal afterward conveyed the title to 285 acres of the
primary water right to the Indianola Irrigation Company and received in lieu thereof a certificate for 285
shares of its class A stock, now represented by certificates No. 84 and No. 8G.
Sixth:
closed.

Hugentobler and Hadlock mortgages fore-

The Hugentobler and Hadlock mortgages were foreclosed in case No. 2888. In that case all of the defamlants in this action, except Irwin l\L Price, were parties
defendant.
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At the time the judgment and decree of foreclosure
was entered in that case certificates No. 72 and No. 73
\Vere outstanding, and, as the court found, were then in
the possession of Richard H. Spencer.
The decree in that case foreclosed all of the defendants in the action of all their rights in and to the water
rights covered by the Hugentobler and Hadlock mortgages; and in that case the court found as a fact that
the water rights which wore included in the Hugentobler
and Hadlock mortgages were a part of the same water
right which Richard H. Spencer had deeded to the Indianola Irrigation Company on November 25, 1931, and
which were the water rights which supported certificates
72 and 73.
1

'!'he court, however, did not do as it should have
dono, namely, order 72 and 73 to he surrendered up and
cancelled and a now certificate issued to whoever had
a rig-ht to the 45 shares remaining after deducting the
fi;) acres for Hngentohlor and the 60 acres for Hadlock from the HiO acres; but the court did reserve for
future determination what to do ahout those certificates.
At tho foroelosure sale in ease No. 2888 Hugcntobler
l1ccame the purchaser of the lands and water rights covered hy his mortgage. 'rhis is the land and water right
now owned hy Quo .T onsen. At the sale Hadlock became
tho purchaser of the land and water right covered by
his mortgage. This is the water right now owned by the
plaintiff.
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Hugentobler and Hadlock received their sheriff's
deeds on the foreclosure sale in the late fall of 1937, after
the irrigation season.
Thereafter, beginning with the irrigation season of
19i38 and coming right down to the time this case was
tried, whenever the bank commissioner and his successor in title attempted to make use of the water right, in
the turns assigned by the water master for their use,
the Spencers interfered with their dams and took the
water themselves, claiming the right to do so because
they said Irwin M. Price owned certificates No. 72 and
No. 73 and they had some arrangement with him permitting them to use the water represented by those
certificates. (Tr. 209-2'11)
Since Irwin M. Price was not a party to case No.
2888, it was imposible to reach him in that case, so the
plaintiff brought this action, naming him as one of the
defendants and also bringing in all of the defendants in
that action to settle the rights which had been brought
into dispute again by this claim now asserted by Richani H. an<l .John Edison Spencer that Price was the
owner of the stock certificates.
Of course neither Hugentobler nor Hadlock ever
claimed any interest in certificates No. 72 and 73. They
claimed adversely to those certificates. They claimed and
still claim that when their mortgages were foreclosed the
water rights which underlay those certificates were taken
away from the Indianola Irrigation Company, leaving
that corporation in the unhappy situation of having cer-
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tificates for 115 shares of its class A stock outstanding
with no foundation in water rights to support them.
In this action Richard H. Spencer and John Edison
Spencer disclaimed all interest in all the water rights
mentioned and described in the plaintiff's complaint.
Both signed the disclaimer personally and verified the
same before their attorney Lewis Larson. That disclaimer still stands in the records of this action and
it is still binding upon those defendants.
At the time Richard H. Spencer and John Edison
Spencer filed their disclaimer, there was also filed by
Mr. Larson an answer on behalf of the defendant Irwin
J\L Price, which includes a disclaimer and an affirmative
defense. This answer is not signed by Price nor is it
verified by him. rrhere is no evidence in the record which
indicates that Price ever knew that this answer had
been filed in his behalf, but there is evidence suggesting
the contrary.
\Ve hasten to disclaim any intention to impugne the
good faith of Mr. Larson in filing this answer and state
that we feel that he (lid so in the belief that Richard
H. and John l1Jdison were authorized by Price to represent him in retaining Mr. Larson to represent him in
this action.
In his affirmative defense to the plaintiff's complaint Irwin J\L Price is made to allege:
"That he does claim lGO shares of the Primary water of Indianola Irrigation Company, con-
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veyed to the Indianola Inigation Company by
H. H. Spencer, and appropriated by sai(l H. H.
Spencer and his predecessors in interest upon that
particular tract of land described as follows; towit:
rrhe south half of the northwest quarter, and the
north half of the southwest quarter of Section 5, in
rrownship 12 South, Range 4 ]1Jast of Salt Lake
Meridian, containing 160 acres, in Sanpete County,
State of Utah, which said water was heretofore,
in about the year lD;H, conveyed by deed from
R. H. Spencer to the Indianola Inigation Company, for which certificate of said Indianola Irrigation Company, No. 57, was issued to said R.
H. Spencer, and which certificate was thereafter
split and issued in the form of two certificates
known as certificates No. 72 and 7:3 of the Indianola Irrigation Company, and which waters
so evidenced, were appropriated by said R. H.
Spencer and his predecessors in interest, upon
said described lands in Section 5, more than sixty
years next prior to the commencement of this
action, and this defendant has never diverted, or
attempted to divert or authorized any one to
divert any waters other than those ~waters so appropriatl,d, which said waters at the time of said
diversion, were owned and are now owned by this
defendant.''
This answer is signed by Lewis Larson as attorney
for Irwin l\L Price and was verified by Mr. Larson on
April 22, 1942.
ARGUMENT
I.
The Price Affidavit
Inasmuch as the only right which Richard H. Spen-
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cer and John Edison Spencer have ever claimed to the
Hugentobler and \:Vhittaker water rights, since the execution of the sheriff's deeds thereon in the foreclosure
sale in case No. 2888, is based upon their claim that
Irwin M. Price was the owner of certificates 72 and 73
and they had an understanding with him for the use of
the water right represented by those certificates, it is
no wonder their camp was thrown into confusion and
consternation upon the filing of the Irwin M. Price affidavit.
rche utter falsehood of their claim was exposed by
that afficlavit. Having themselves disclaimed all interest
in all the water rights described in the plaintiff's complaint, ancl having tal;:en Hugentobler's and Hadlock's
water turns uncler the claim that Price owned 72 ancl 73,
an<l they had rentecl the water from him, they stood exposed to shame as trespassers and water thieves, with
no semblance of rights upon which to justify their conduct over all the years since 1938 during which they
have taken the water when it was Hadlock's and Whittaker's turns.
The Price affidavit was not produced by the plaintiff. It came into the case from the administrator in his
cross action against .T ohn Edison and Mrs. Tibbs.

If it had not been for the false claim which they
causecl to be set up in the answer of Irwin M. Price to
our complaint, this case woulcl have been summarily disposed of years ago; for plaintiff would have been entitled to judgment on the pleadings against all of the
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defendants, Tibbs and some of the others being in default, Indianola Irrigation Company taking about the
samo position that plaintiff maintained, and Richard
H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer having disclaimed.
We feel that a great wrong has been done to all
parties concerned by the way Richard H. Spencer and
John Edison Spencer have been permitted to trifle with
the court and with the rights of others by hiding their
actions behind the screen of the claim which they asserted in behalf of Irwin M. Price.
It was therefore no little satisfaction to us when,
without any help from our side, their nefarious conduct stood exposed by the filing of the Price affidavit.

We simply could not help recollecting the old saw,
that when thieves fall out just men get their dues.
II.
Whittaker's Right has not been Lost
by Nonuser, nor by Adverse
Possession.

Appe1lants .John Edison Spenco'r and Elizabeth A.
Tibbs in their brio[ at page 82 mako the claim that the
Whittaker right has been acquired by John Edison Spencer by adverse use and lost to plaintiff under Section
100-1-4, Code, and the doctrine of Earnmond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 Pac. (2d) 894.
In answer to such claim we point out the facts bearing upon the subject. Hadlock was not authorized to use
the 60 acres of water right until his mortgage was fore-
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closed and the sheriff's deed was issued on the foreclosure sale after the period of redemption had exp~red.
During all that period the mortgagor had the right to
the use of the water right. The sheriff's deed is dated
December 9, 1937, recorded December 16, 1937, which was
after the irrigation season for that year. So that Hadlock
was not entitled to use the water until the beginning of
the irrigation season of 1938.
There seems to have been no trouble over the use
of the water in 1938. But when Hadlock and Whittaker
took it in 1939, 1940 and 1941, in the turns assigned for
its usc, Richard H. Spencer and John Edison interferred
with their use of it and took the water away from them.
rl'h is aeti on was filed in July of 1~)41 to quiet title to
the right and the right has been in litigation ever since
that time.
The foregoing facts do not sustain the claim that
plaintiff has lost his right by not using it, for he did all
he could do to make use of it and was prevented by the
wrongful acts of those defendants. Not being willing to
resort to the use of force to keep the water in his ditches
when it was his turn to make usc of it against these two
trespassers, the plaintiff took the only course open to
him to protect hi;.; right, namely, he filed his action in
the district court to quiet his title and get an injunction
against the defendants to restrain them from interfering with his use.
The facts refute the claim of abandonment and adverse title.
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III.
Appellants are estopp,ed to claim
that the Hadlock mortgage is void.

(a) They are estopped by the mortgage itself.
Richard H. Spencer executed that mortgage. Appellant
Richard Leo Spencer, as administrator of the estate of
Richard H. Spencer, deceased, stands in no better position than did his intestate. Since Richard H. Spencer
is estopped by the mortgage to say that it is void for
uncertainty, so is his administrator estopped.
The rule of law under which this estoppel is claimed
1s the same with respect to a mortgage as to a deed.
In 21 C. J. 1067, Section 26, the rule is stated in
this lant,ruage :

''A person who assumes to convey an estate
by deed is estopped, as against the grantee, to
assert anything in derogation of the deed. He will
not be heanl, for the purpose of defeating the
title o[ the grantee, to say that at the time of the
conveyanc(~ l1e had no title, or that none passed by
the deed, nor can he deny io the deed its full operation and efl'ect as a conveyane0."
As to mortgages: 21 C. J. 1068, Section 27:
''Conforming to the general rule a mortgagor
is estopped to assert anything in derogation of
the rights which the instrument purports to convey .... "
The general rule above stated must of necesity be
the rule here because of the implied covenants in the
mortgage.
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The Hadlock mortgage is m the statutory form of
mortgages in use in this state.
Section 78-1-13, Code,

r~eads

in part:

''Such a mortgage when executed as required
by law shall have the effect of a conveyance of the
land therein described .... to the mortgagee, his
heirs, assigns and 'legal representatives, as security for the payment of the indebtedness therein set
forth, with covenants from the mortgagor of general warranty of title .... ''
What are the covenants of general warranty of title
mentioned in this statute?
rrhe answer, we suggest, is found in Section 78-1-11,
Code, relative to warranty deeds. In this section it is
provided:
''Such deed when executed as required by
law shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee
simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of
the premises therein named together with all
appurtenances, rights and privileges there unto
belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his
heirs and personal representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the
grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet possession thereof; and that the grantor, his heirs
and personal representatives will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the g-rantee,
his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims
whatsoever.''
That such are the covenants of general warranty of
title see also the definitions of "covenants of warranty"

in Bouvier's Law Dictionary; and 15 C. J. 1230, Section 40, under the title "Covenants," where it is said
that in the United States the usual covenants of title are
the covenants of seizen, or right to convey, against incumbrances, for quiet 'enjoyment, and of warranty.

It would indeed be a sad state of affairs if Richard H. Spencer, or his administrator, or any one claiming under him by a conveyance executed subsequent to
the date of the Hadlock mortgage, were to be permitted
to come in at this late date and say that the mortgage is
void and the mortgagee got no title to the water right
by the foreclosure of the mortgage and the purchase at
the sheriff's sale.
Richard H. Spencer received the consideration for
which he executed that mortgage. There would be no
equity or justice in permitting his administrator or
his children John Edison and Mrs. Tibbs to come in now
and get the water right on the claim that the mortgage is void for uncertainty in the description, the only
uncertainty claimed being that the description of the
land to which the right was appurtenant is not included
in the mortgage.
In equity and good conscience the appellants ought
to be estopped.
(b)

The

administrator

and John

Edison are

estopped by the disclaimers which were filed in answer
to the complaint of the plaintiff in this action; and we
think this goes for Mrs. Tibbs also because she is claim-
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mg under her father. Richard H. Spencer's disclaimer
has never been repudiated by any pleading filed in this
action. John Edison's disclaimer has never been repudiated by him by any direct action on his part; he
never did ask the lower court to permit him to withdraw
that disclaimer or to be relieved from its binding effect.
But he was permitted over our objection to file certain
answers which are inconsistent with the disclaimer.
To disclaim means to disavow, to renunciate. In a
pleading it means a renunciation by the defendant of all
claim to the subject of the demand made by the plaintiff. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary.)
John Etlison and Richard H. having renounced and
disavowed by their verified pleading filed in this action
all claims to the subject of the demand made by the
plaintiff, namely, the GO acres of: water right which is
the suhject of tl1is action, they are now estopped to
assert that ihe Hadlock mortgage is void and that they
own tl1is same water right.
(c) Appellants are all estopped by the record and
the ;judgment in ease No. 2888 to assert that the Hadlock
mortgage is voifl for uncertainty in the description of
the water right.
The law on which we stand here is found in 21 C. J.
1OG3, Section 21, staterl as follows:

"It is a well establishefl rule that the records
of a court of justice import absolute verity, and
no one, whether or not a party to the proceeding
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in which it was made, may in a collateral proceeding impeach it by adducing evidence in denial of
the facts of which is purports to be a memorial.''
See also 34 C. J. 511, Section 815, from which we
quote:
"A judgment by a court having jurisdiction
of the parties and the subject matter, unless reversed or annulled in some proper proceeding, is
not open contradiction or impeachment, in respect to its validity, verity, or binding effect, by
parties or privies, in any collateral action or proceeding, except for fraud in its procurement.... "
"'rhe reason for the rule that judgments of
a court of record cannot be called in question in
a collateral proceeding is one of necessity. The
basic reason for the rule is founded on the consideration that the regular and orderly way of
trying tlw validity of judgments is by an appeal or
other appropriate proceeding in the case itself,
or under the statute permitting a vacation of
judgments for certain enumerated reasons."
Quoted from -Wick v. Rea, :54 Wash. 424, 427,
10:1 Pac. 4G2.
Also sec .34 C. J. 859, Section 1262, from which
we quote:
''In an action for the recovery of real property, or to try title, or to foreclose a mortgage or
other lien, or for trespass, defendant must set up
all the titles or claims to the property which he
holds or can make available in his behalf; failure
to a:-::sert any title or claim in such action will preclude him from setting it up afterward.... "
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See also: 34 C. J. 944, Section 1345, from which we
quote:
''When the existence and VALIDITY of a de·ed
or other contract is adjudicated, either being put
in issue and tried, OR IN THE SENSE OF BEING NECESSARILY DE'TERMINED BY A
JUDGMENT ENFORCING THE CONTRACT,
or refusing to set it aside, the question is conclusively settled by the judgment for the purposes of
all further litigation between the same parties;
and this rule applies, even though the issue was
not raised in the action, since in that case the
judgm·ent necessarily implies a finding that the
cause of action was valid and enforceable. . . . "
The existence and validity of the Hadlock mortgage
were tendered as issues in case No. 2888. John Edison
Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs were parties to that action; so was Richard H. Spencer a party, and all of
them were served with summons and Richard H. and
John :Ejdison were actually present at the trial of that
case.
If they had any idea that the Hadlock mortgage was

void for the uncertainty in the description in the water
right, they had an opportunity to assert that defense.
That was the proper time for them to assert it, for then
the plaintiff could have asked for a

reformat~<J'l:

of the.

mortgage if the court had held that th-;AiiorMjwffv-arV
faulty. They had their day in court on that issue.
We cite still another statement from 34 C. J. 962,
this time from Section 1368:
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''The judgment in a mortgage foreclosure
suit i::; conclusive of all questions actually tried
and determined or necessarily involved, including title to the premises if that was in i::;sue and
passed upon. ''.Che general rules as to persons concluded by judgment are applicable to judgments
in foreclosure proceedings .... ''
The general rule is found in Section 1405, same volume:
"To constitute a judgment an estoppel there
must be a substantial identity of parties as well
as of subject matter; that is, it is necessary that
the parties as between whom the judgment is
claimed to be an estoppel must have been parties
to the action in which it was rendered, in the same
capacities and in the same antagnostic relation,
or else they must be in privity with the parties in
such former action.... "
In that action Hadlock was plaintiff and John Edison and Mrs. Tibbs was defendant and Richard H. Spencer, the intestate who is now represented by the administrator, was a defendant. The plaintiff stands in
this case as plaintiff in the shoes of Hadlock. So that
ail the conditions for an estoppel are here present.
The court in No. 2888 found by implication that the
Hadlock mortgage was a valid instrument and foreclosed it. lt found that the mortgage covered the 60
acres of water right which is the subject of this action.
The court also found as a fact in that case that the
Hugentobler 55 acres and the Hadlock 60 acres of water
right were part of the same water right was con-
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veyed by Richard H. Spencer to the Indianola Irrigation
Company on November 25, 1931, and which supported
certificates 72 and 73.
So that we now say that all of the appellants in this
action are estopped and in good conscience and 'equity
they ought to be estopped to assert now that the Hadlock mortgage is void and to assert that the Hadlock
mortgage covered any other water right than that which
was conveyed to the irrigation company for the stock
now represented in 72 and 73. rl1he record and the judgment in case No. 2888 are conclusive against them.
Counsel in the brief accuses us of aUempting in this
action to relitigate case No. 2888, which is a surprising
thing to say; because it is he and not us who has raised
the issue in this case of the validity of the mortgage. We
arc only trying in this action to secure the benefits of
the judgment in that case, to enforce it. We stand on the
mortgage as written, we stand on the judgment as rendered. \Ve ask for no reformation of the mortgage, for
it need:,; no reformation.
IV.
The issue of the validity of the Hadlock
mortgage !is res adjudicata.

In case No. 2888 Hadlock, the state bank commissioner, pleaded his mortgage and prayed for its foreclosure. 1'hc defendants in that action, who included
Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs, were all served with summons in this state.
After issues had been framed on the pleadings, a trial

l

'
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was had to the court. The court found that the mortgage
had been ex>ecuted as alleged, that the defendants were
in default, and the mortgage was foreclosed by the judgment of the court; and the court further found that the
water rights which were included in the Hugentobler
and Hadlock mortgages were part of the same water
rights which were included in the deed to Indianola Irrigation Company and upon which rested the validity of
eertificates 72 and 73. The court in that case foreclosed
the right of aU of the defendants in that action, including the defendants Richard H. Spencer, John J1.Jdison and
Elizabeth A. Tibbs, and also the Indianola Irrigation
Company, in and to the water rights described in the
Hugentobler and Hadlock mortgages. In other words,
the court enforced the contract, which necessarily implied an adjudication that the contract or mortgage was
a valid and binding obligation.
The law upon which we rely in support of our
claim that the validity of the Hadlock is res adjudicata
on these appellants is to be found in 34 C. J. 742, Section 11:)4, where the general rule is stated in the fol1owing language :
'"!'he doctrine of res judicata, first definiteKing~;ton's ease,
embodies iwo main rules, which may he stated as
follows: '' 1) 'I' he .T udgment or decree of a court
o[ competent ;iurisdidion upon the merits concln<les the parties all(l privies to the litigation and
constitutes a har to a new action or suit involving
the same cause of action either before the same or
h' fontlldatetl in the Dneltt_'ss o[

I

[!
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any other tribunal. 2) Any right, fact, or matter in
issue, and directly adjudicated upon, or NECESSAHII,Y INVOLVED IN, the determination of
an action before a competent court in which a
judgment or decree is rendered upon the merits
is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated 'between the parties
whether the claim or demand, purpose or subject
matter of the two suits is the same or not. . . .
Res Judicata is a rule of universal law prevading
every well regulated system of jurisprudence, and
is put upon two grounds, embodied in various
maxims of the common law; the one, public policy
and neceBsity, which makes it 'to the interest of
the state that there should be an end to litigation .... ; the other, the hardship on the individual
that he should be vexed twice for the same cause.
The doctrine applies and treats the final determination of the action as speaking the infallible
truth as to the rights of the parties as to the entire subject of the controversy, and such controversy and every part of it must stand irrevocably
closed by such determination. The sum and substance of the whole doctrine is that a matter once
judicially decided is finaUy decided.''
A Utah case supporting the proposition

that a

judgment is conclusive as to matters which wer'e or might
have 'been interposed is Logan City vs. Utah Power
& Light Co., 86 Utah 340, 16 Pac. 2d. 1097, the syllabus on

the point being as follows:
"Judgment is conclusive against party as to
all matters of defense which were or might have
been interposed.''
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Since these appellants might have interposed the
defense that the mortgage is void for uncertainty in the
description of the water right in case No. 2888, and failed
to make such defense, they are now estopped to set up
that defense in this action, which is brought only to enable the plaintiff to enforce the judgment in that case.
The defense is not open to them here because the
judgment is res adjudicata on that defense.
The validity of the Hadlock mortgage was necessarily invo'lved in case No. 2888; for if it had not been
found to be a valid mortgage, the court would not hav:e
foreclosed it. Therefore that judgment speaks the infallible truth as to the right of the plaintiff in that action to take Spencer's water right away from him by
sale on foreclosure and also definitely decides that all
rights which any of the appellants in this case may have
had in the water rights described in the mortgage were
foreclosed. These defendants and appellants are barred
by that judgment from now asserting that the Hadlock
mortgage is void.
It IS almost impossible to imagine a case
where the undisputed facts sustain a more complete estopple by record and judgment and a claim of res adjudicata.

The defendants and appellants in law and equity
are now barred forever by the record and judgment in
2888 to assert that the Hadlock mortgage is void.
Of course, if the mortgage is valid, then all the proceedings in 2888 are valid; and we will not enter here
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upon a discussion of that record to sustain our
position. The only attack on the judgment in that case
rests upon the assertion that the mortgage is void.
In his brief counsel for John Edison and Mrs. rribbs
more than once throws out the charge that we are trying
to retry No. 2888. About all we can say in answer to
that charge is that it is he and not us who is trying to
retry that case by attacking the valjdity of our mortgage. All we want to do is to sustain and enforce the
judgment in that case. We claim under it as it is written. Neither are we trying, as he also charges, to reform
our mortgage. There is no such thought in our minds.
We stand on the mortgage as written and claim under
it. All we want the court to do is to read and understand
that mortgage with the same knowledge and understanding that the parties to it had when they made it concerning the subject matter therein mentioned and the
meaning of the terms used therein; and to enforce that
judgment and quiet our title to the water rights and
enjoin appellants from interfering hereafter with our
use of it.
Counsel also makes the suggestion that the parties
may have intended tho Hadlock mortgage to be a second
mortgage. But there is nothing at all in the record to
sustain him in this position. While I have pointed out
in another connection in this brief that by reason of Section 78-1-13 and Section 78-1-11 there is read into the
Hadlock mortgage a covenant from the mortgagor to
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the mortgagee that the property therein mortgaged
free from incumbrances.

IS

v.
The Hadlock mortgage is not void for ,uncertainty.

If the Hadlock mortgage be read, as it should be
read, and understood in accordance with the actual meaning and intention of the parties to it, as manifested in the
first instance by the terms which they have chosen to
employ in the instrument itself, in the light of their long
continued and practical usage and construction; if we
reacl this mortgage with the knowledge and understanding which the parties to it had of the subject matter of
their contract, there is nothing uncertain about it. They
knew and understoo<l that it was intended to cover GO
acres out of Hichar<l H. Spencer's 448 acres of primary
or cla::-;s A water right in Thistle creek, which 448 acres
were a part of a total of 1728 acres of primary or class
A water right on the stream; and that it was not inten< led to he a pledge of any t'hares of stock.

There is implicit in the art,rument on the other side
as the major premise the proposition that a mortgage
on a water right in this state is void unless it contains
a description of the land upon which the water right has
heen used and to which it is appurtenant.
\V e point out to the court in this connection that no
court has ever so held. No case or other authority is
cited by the other ::-;ide and we confidently assert that
none can be cited which has held that such is the law;
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for there are many ways in which a water right may be
described and identified without ev·en mentioning the
land upon which the water is used.

It would seem to be unnecessary because it is so
self evident to point out that a water right is an intangible something, existing only in contemplation of law,
and hence not capable of being identified and seen or
appreciated through the means of any of the five senses.
It is simply a right which a person ~as to go upon a
stream or source of supply and div;ert therefrom a certain quantity of water and use it for beneficial purposes. These old rights, which originated by diversion
and beneficial use long prior to the time there was any
law in this state which required records to be made of
them, have practically all been conveyed to irrigation
companies by deeds no more definite than the deed which
Spencer made to the Indianola Irrigation Company.
They are described only with reference to the county in
which the water is diverted, the name of the stream,
the name of the owner of the right, the name of the
grantee, and the number of acre feet or second feet or
by any one of a number of means of measurement which
might be employed. The county recorders keep books of
water transfers, with indexes for the same, so that there
is a public notice of their execution and of their contents,
and no one need he misinformed as to the records, so
far as they may go. But anyone experienced in such matters will always make special inquiries as to water rights,
for it is well known that the records of these old rights
are not all that ·exacting lawyers might want them to be.
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It would be a serious blow to property rights in
this state if the court should uphold the appellants' contention with respect to this Hadlock mortgage and with
respect to the deed to the Indianola Irrigation Company.
For thousand of dollars in property rights would he
invalidated by such a holding.

A water right which is appurtenant to a particular
tract of land because it is used thereon may be severed
from the land and thereby cease to he appurtenant. One
way of effecting a severance is by a deed of conveyance
of the water right without the land, another way is to
convey the land and reserve the water right, and still
another way is to mortgage the water right but not the
land and then have the mortgage foreclosed. The latter
is the way the ~everance was accomplished in the case of
the water right covered by Hadlock's mortgage. The
severance did not occur, as has been pointed out heretofore, until the execution of the sheriff's deed on the foreclosure sale.
See in this connection: 67 C. J. 1038, 1039, 1040,
1041, subject "\:Vaters:"
1<-,rom Section 481 we quote:
"\Vhere possible, without violating the intention of the parties, a contract conveying an
interest in water will be given such construction
as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect."
This also from 67 C. J. 1079, Section 557:

"Under general rules a grant or reservation
of water rights should be construed in accordance
with the actual meaning and intention of the
parties, as manifested in the first instance hy the
terms they have chosen to emp'Joy in the instrument of conveyance, which may he read in the
light of their long continued practical usage or
construction, and the meaning of which may be
further elucidated by comparing the various parts
of the instrument and reading it in connection
with contemporary or even subsequent deeds or
contracts relating to the same subject, or considering contemporaneous circumstances known to the
parties. The tendency is to adopt that construction which gives the grantee an unrestricted right
or privilege, rather than a limited one.''
We adopt here because it is as good a statement
of the law upon this subject as we have found in the
books the following statement from 36 Am. Jur., Section
42, found in appellants' brief on pages 5G and 57, relative to the construction of description;,; of water rights in
mortgages:
"In regard to an ambugity in a mortgage, the
modern tendency is to allow a liberal interpretation of the description of the property AND TO
UPHOLD THJ1J VALIDJCI'Y OF THFJ MORTGAGE IF IN ANY WAY IT IS POSSIBLE TO
ARRIVJjJ A'T THE INTJiJNrriON OF r:I'IHJ
PARTII1JS THERFJTO .... "
"Furthermore, a description may be sufficient even though it may he necessary on account of its inperfect or indefinite character to
aid the intention of the parties by averring and
proving extrinsic facts. Accordingly, in order to
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identify the property intended to be mortgaged,
and to give effect to the intention of the parties
to the instrument, parol evidence is generally held
admissibl,e to explain a mistake in description of
property in a mortgage, or to explain and remove
any uncertainty."
See also Payton, et al v. Browning, 290 P. 253,
wherein 1\fr. Justice Simms, writing for the supreme
court of New Mexico, states the rule for the construction of deeds to water rights, and the rule for mortgages
should be even more liberal, if anything, as follows:
''In arriving at a correct solution of this
problem, it is the provience and duty of the court
to place itself as nearly as possible in the situation of the parties to the instruments under which
title is elaimed, and endeavor to <liscover and
give effect to the intention of the parties. Simpson v. Blaisdell, Rfl Me. 1!l9, 27 A. 101, ;);) Am.
St. Rep. :148. Much is said in the hooks about
deeds which are void heeause of uneertainty in
tl1e deseription of the premises attempted to he
conveyc<l, hut it is not to he understood that the
sufrieiency of the description in a deed is to he
mcasure<l by any inflexible rule m· set of' rules.
rl'he tost in ever~; ease of contracts other than
clec<1s, is whctlwr or not the intention of the
parties can he <liscovered and effectuated."
\Vhile the Hadlock mortgage has never appeared to
us to be open to just criticism on account of any defect
in the description of the water right, yet we knew that
the attack would be made if the opportunity were presented; and it is with the foregoing rules of construction in mind that we drafted the complaint in this action,
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incorporating therein the allegations of matters of inducement and background which l1elp to an understanding of the situation in which the parties stood and which
help to correct understanding of the meaning of the
terms which the parties used in the mortgage to describe the 60 acres which Richard H. Spencer intended
to give to the bank commissioner as security for the
payment of his debt. All these matters are either admitted in the pleadings or were found to be true by the
court from the evidence and are now incorporated in
the findings of fact.
Is it possible for any one, except a lawyer who is
trying to find a way out for his client, to read the complaint and the findings of fact in this case and not know
to a reasonable certainty that Spencer intended to mortgage 60 acres out of his 448 acres which he had not
mcfr"tga_qed~r %anyI ~l el,;eb.~:-1~e~ed to mort~ll'i28 acres of s4ch~
.c)
v
'
I

.//

..;'/

"Sixty acres of water right." That is a;,; certain
and definite as it can be. The parties knew, and we now
know, since witnesses have given testimony in this case,
that 60 acres of water right means the right to take
water from Thistle creek in turns with the other users
for a definite number of minutes, at definite length
of time between turns, in rotation with the users having
in all 1729 acres of such rights.
The parties knew, as we now know, that according
to the practices which have been established among the
water users, the water master on the stream each sea-
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son notifies ·each user when his turns come and how
long to keep the use of the water. No man's rights are
unlimited but they are all qualified by the rights of all
other users on the stream.
The water master does not tell Spencer: It is your
turn now to use the water which was decreed to you because you owned the Jim Ownup farm or any other
farm. He simply tells Spencer when his turn comes to
use the water, and Spencer uses it on any land he pleases.
The place where he used the water is not important.
'The turns when he may use it and the length of his
turns are the important factors because those factors
must be made to mesh in with the same factors pertaining to the rights of all others on Thistle creek to the end
that each water user will get his just share of the available supply according to his rights. These factors are
a:-; certain as arithmetic can make them, for there are
1728 acres or shares of class A or primary rights on
r:l'histle creek, Spencer owned 448 shares or acres of them,
and he mortgaged 60 shares or acres thereof to Hadlock.
The source of supply is certain-Thistle creek; the
county in which the diversion is made is certain-Sanpete; the state is certain-Utah; the ownership is certain-Richard H. Spencer; the grantee is certain-Hadlock, the bank commissioner; the (ruantity is certain GOshares or acres, which we know means 60 out of 448
acres which Spencer owned and which he had not theretofore mortgaged. vVe also know that the 60 acres mort-
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gaged to Hadlock did not include any water right used
on the lands in Section 3, because the mortgage says so.

If \Ve follow the law which we have quoted from
Judge Hansen's brief, and uphold the validity of this
mortgage if any way is possible to arrive at the intention of the parties thereto, we have no difficulty whatever when we read it in the light of the extrinsic facts
which arc shown by undisputed evidence and indeed
which are admitted by all parties concerned and which
have been found by the court in its findings of facts to
be true.
In the light of that evidence and those findings, we
know for a certainty that Spencer mortgaged 60 acres of
the only water right which he owned and which was
not then encumbered by liens of prior mortgages to
Hugentobler and Federal, and that the same was a part of
the water right which had been decreed to him in the 160
acres in the vVansits farm in Section 5 and the city lot
of 3 acres.
If there could be said to be any uncertainty in regard to \vhat water right Spencer intended. to mortgage,
all such uncertainty has been removed by Richard H.
Spencer and John Edison Spencer themselves, for they
have claimed at all times and. the appellants now claim
that the only water right which was not then mortgaged
when the Hadlock mortgage was executed was the 160
acres on the Wansits farm in Section 5 and the 3 acres

of city lot water. ,T ohn EcUson Spencer himself so testified.
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It so heppens, as tho court found in case No. 2888
and also in this case, to be a part of the same right which
was allocated to Spencer in the decree of 1920 in case No.
1406, and which Spencer conveyed by deed to the irrigation company on November 25, 1931, and upon which
the irrigation company issued the certificate which later
became certificates 72 and 73.
There is no doubt or question about the foregoing.
There is no one way in which to describe a water
right in a mortgage. It might be a good way, indeed it
might even be the best way, to tie the description of the
right to a description by metes and bounds of the lands
upon which the right is appurtenant. But parties do not
have to use the best way. Often they do not. It is the duty
of the courts to accept the way which has been employed
by the parties and then try to find out from their writings, road and understood in the light of the knowledge
which the parties have of the subject matter of their contract and of tho surrounding circumstances and with the
same knowledge which tho parties had of the moaning of
tho language which they employed, and then to give effect if possible to their contracts.
1\Iost deeds and mortgages to water rights in this
state, we venture to assert, which are not intended to
include also the lands upon which the waters are used,
contain no description by metes and bounds or legal subdivisions of the lands.
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The deed from Spencer to the Indianola Irrigation
Company does not. The deed from Federal to the Indianola Irrigation Company does not.
All the shares in this corporation which are now outstanding are based upon deeds of conveyance which do
not describe any land.
A casual glance through the records of water conveyances in this county, or in any other county of the
state, will disclose hundreds, yes, thousands, of conveyances of water rights in which no land is described.

Most such conveyances simply mention the name of
the grantor, the county in which the right is exercised,
the name of the grantee, the source of supply, and then
in some manner identify the water right by some appropriate description as to second feet or acre feet and so
on.
In his brief counsel for appellants state that it is not
clear whether the validity of the mortgage should be
tested by the law relating to real estate or to personal
property, and so he proceeds to test it by both.
It looks very much like an absurdity to test it by the
law relating to personal property, since we all know it
must be tested by the law relating to the real estate, so

far as possible.
In making the test by the law of personal property
counsel refer to the case of Jacobsen v. Christiansen, 18
Utah 149, 65 P. 562, holding that a mortgage is void for
uncertainty which describes 500 sheep bearing certain
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marks and brands and the evidence m the case showed
that the mortgagor had a larger number of sheep in the
herd bearing the same marks and brands.
Since counsel has brought in that case and cites the
law of chattels, we answer by calling the court's attention to some more of the law of chattels.
In 11 C. J., page 464, Sec. 84(2), we read:
"vVhore the mortgaged chattels are of uniform quality and value, such as are ascertained
hy weight, measure, or count, and the constituent
parts, which make up the mass, are not distinguished by any physical difference in size,
shape, or quality, a mortgage of a part of the
undivided whole is valid for all purposes."
~ince

4--!8 acres of primary water right has no parts
and one aero is exactly like another, if there may be said
to he likeness relative to things which have no substance,
we think the law o[ chattels which we have cited above
suppli(•s tho test, if' the law relative to personal property
is to he applied.
G0/-~48t1Js

~o

applying it, the mortgage covers

of Npencer's water right, and under that law

tl1e mortga§..!;e must he sustained.
In making the test by the law of real property counsel cites ca:-;es and authorities holding that descriptions
of real estate must he so eertain that an officer can take
the writ or instrument and iclentify the land, point out
iis houmlaries and put tho trespasser out and the lawful
0

•

owner m possessiOn.
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But such descriptions cannot be made for water
rights. A water right is intangible. It has no boundaries.
It cannot be seen. It exists only in contemplation of law
like a corporation. No officer could take a writ for a
water right and go out and find such right. He could
find out who is using water from a certain stream at a
certain time, just as we did when we went to Thistle
valley and found out that the Spencers were taking the
water in the turns which had been set aside for us.
Just because descriptions which are appropriate for
tracts of land cannot be used in describing water rights,
which have no substance, the authorities which are cited
by the other side on this subject are not controlling.
Counsel says that the sheriff could not find the Whittaker water right and that we went up there and looked
for it but could not find it. Our answer is that we knew
better than to look for a water right which we knew
we could not see. \Vhat the sheriff looked for and what
we looked for and what the sheriff found and what we
found was who was taking the water out of our ditches
when we were trying to make use of it in the turns which
had been set aside for our use. vVe found exactly what
we were looking for, namely Richard H. and .John Edison, taking the water from us and we sued them.
Ever since the day when the pioneers first turned
the waters of City Creek upon the potato patches which
they planted in their new Zion right down to the present
time water rights in this country have been measured and
described by fractional parts of the whole source of
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supply, and by fractional parts with limitations as to the
periods of time when used; just as the water users in
Thistle valley have always distributed and measured
their rights in Thistle creek.
See Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888, Vol. 11, page 135,
from which we quote:
"'The right to the use of water may be measured by fractional parts of the whole source of
supply, or by fractional parts, with limitation as
to periods of time when used.''
The standard unit of measurement since we adopted
the ~Wyoming Code in 19'19 has been the second foot.
(Sec. 100-1-2, Code.) But it is a simple problem in arithmetic, after the stream has been divided into ditches according to the fractional parts thereof owned by the
water users, to measure the parts by the cubic foot standard. The custom still persists of describing water rights
in decrees, deeds, mortgages and contracts just exactly
as they have been described from time immemorial by
the fanners in Indianola and as they are described in
Hadloek's mortgage. This custom will likely endure
long aft(~r our day. It has become habitual with our
people. "l'here is no reason why they should be required
to give it up. It has worked out all right so far and will
likely continue to meet with the needs of the people.
So why try to change it~ It takes some engineering skill
an(l more accurate measuring devices than are generally
in use to measure small streams by the second foot;
but practical farmers with their crude dams and home

made ditches do pretty well when it comes to dividing
the stream among themselves, or when they have their
water masters do it, by fractional part.
At page 66 in the brief counsel cites four Utah cases
which he says sustain his argument that the Hadlock
mortgage is void for uncertainty in the description of
the water right. But a glance at those cases will disclose that none of them is in point to this case because
they all differ in their facts.
In Elliott v. Whitmone, 8 Utah 254, 30 P. 984, the
supreme court remanded the case for a new trial so that
the lower court could take evidence regarding a
number of facts which had to be found before a proper
decree could be made. There is nothing in the case of aid
here, either as regards the validity of the mortgage or the
decree in No. 2888.
In Smith v. Phillips, 6 Utah 376, 23 P. 932, the water
right in the decree is described as a good irrigation
stream. On appeal the court held this description to be
indefinite and uncertain and remanded.
In Nephi Irrigation Co. v. Vickers, 15 Utah :174, 49
P. 301, the trial court found and decreed: "That d.efendant is the owner and has the right to use sufficient of
the waters of Hot creek to irrigate 30 acres of land."
This was held to be uncertain and the case was remanded
to the lower court to hear evidence and find and determine the amount of water, in second feet, or fractional
parts of the stream of water. rrhis description is not the
same as ours and hence the case is not in point.

In Sharp v. Whitmore, 51 Utah 14, 168 P. 273, the
decree on collateral attack was held void for uncertainty.
The attempt had been made to describe the right by giving the capacity of the ditch. But neither the grade of
the ditch nor the velocity of the water was given, so it
was impossible with factors stated to measure the flow.
As the method used in that case is not the method used
here, the case is not in point.
We have stated that a water right may be described
in many different ways.
For example see:

Middle Cut Ditch Co. vs. Henry, 15 Mont. 558, 39 P.
1054, \vhich is cited in G7 C.•J. 10i38, Sec. 479, \vhere it was
held that an instrument whereby the appropriator does
give and grant his water right is sufficient as a conveyance of the usufruct of the water. 1'he land \Vas not described.
II we apply in this case the test \vhich the supreme
court of' New Mexico sayH in the case cited in tJw beginning of this part of our brief \Ve must apply, namely, to
discover and give effect to the intention of the parties,
then this mortgage lllllHt he ;:.;ustained. It i;:.; dear that
Spencer inten<1ed to mortgage something in addition to
the land an<l the water right appurtenant thereto in Section

:1,

for it is Ho ;:.;tatecl in the mortgage. It is clear that

he intended to mortgage GO acres of his mvn water right
of the primary or Class A type. It is clear that he intended to mortgage part of his 448 acres of decreed right.

It is clear that his right was to the use of the waters of
Thistle Creek, in this county. It is beyond question, notwithstanding counsel's assertion to the contrary, that
Spencer did not intend this to be a second mortgage but
that he did intend it to be a first mortgage on the 60
acres of primary water right. It is beyond all question,
for counsel say so in their brief on page 63, that the water
right here involved was always used on Sections 5 and
8 and no part of it was ever used on Section 3, and that,
since the water right which was used on Section 8, the
Old Jim or Jim Ownup farm, went to Federal and underlies certificates 84 and 86, the water right which was
mortgaged to Hadlock must have been that used on Section 5, tl1e \Vansits farm. Such is also John ljjdison 's testimony. It is clear that Spencer did not intend to mortgage to the bank commissioner any of the water rights
which he had theretofore mortgaged to Hugentobler and
Federal. It cannot be questioned that he owned 448 acres
of primary water right out of 1728 acres of such rights
on Thistle creek and that he intended to mortgage 60
acres out of those 448 acres. It is clear that Hadlock
intended to get as security a first mortgage on the 60
acres of water right which Richard H. Spencer owned
in addition to the other security described in the mortgage. It is a simple matter for the water master to make
out the tickets each season for the users of the primary
water rights and to tell Whittaker when his turns come
in rotation with the turns of the users. It is not difficult to enforce this decree, now that we have Price and

the false claim which John Edison and his father have

been making in his name out of the picture. If John
Edison takes the water hereafter when it is Whittaker's
turn, he can be cited into court in a minute and punished
for contempt and also sued for damages. It is not difficult to identify the water right, for John Edison has
put up a stay bond in this appeal and is now using the
water1:3 when it is our turn under the decree to use them.
We shall not refer specifically to the part of the
argument which attacks the validity of the judgment in
case No. 2888. If our mortgage is not void, or if the matter is res adjudicata, or if the appellants are estopped
to attack the mortgage, then the decree is valid.
We wish to call attention to who is not attacking the
judgment in this case and who is attacking it. The lndianola Irrigation Company is not attacking; neither
is Que Jensen, the successor of Hugentobler; neither is
Richard H. Spencer, who is dead and whose disclaimer
still stands; neither is the plaintiff. John Edison is attacking it, right in the face of the disclaimer which he
filed to our complaint; Elizabeth A. Tibbs is attacking it, right in the face of her default in this case, which
stood until her present counsel became interested in the
case; and the administrator of the -estate of Richard
H. Spencer, deceased, is attacking it, right in the face
of the disclaimer which his intestate filed and which
still stands.
We are not concerned with the lawsuit which was
carried on among the Spencer defendants and Mrs. 'Tibbs.
Since they are all foreclosed in this action as they were
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in case No. 2888 of their rights to our water rights, any
rights which any of them may have being subordinate
to the date of our mortgage it mattGrs nothing to ·whittaker who gets certificatesW4 andf6 and what is left in
72 and 7:3 after those certificates are cancelled. Neither
are we concerned with the question which is argued at
length in the brief as to whether the water rights are
appurtenant to the lands. Our rights were severed from
the land when the Hadlock mortgage was foreclosed and
the sheriff's deed on foreclosure was delivered to Hadlock.
VI.

At pages 53 and 54 of their brief appellants
assert that the court erred in awarding Whittaker
60/1728ths of the stream and Que Jensen 55/1728ths
thereof.
The argument on this point is based upon Article 5
of the articles of incorporation of the Indianola Irrigation Company, which describes the Class A and the Class
B stock of that corporation.
Since neither the ·whittaker right nor the Que J ensen right is in the corporation and has not been in the
corporation since the decree was rendered in case No.
2888, and hence is not subject to the regulations prescribed by its articles of incorporation, the argument is
not valid.
There has not been and there will not be any difficulty in the distribution of the water rights in this
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respect. Whittaker and Que Jensen have no controversy
with the Indianola Irrigation Company over this matter, and that corporation represents all of the water
rights on the stream except theirs. There will be no impairment of the Class B. rights, in any event, for the
water will continue to be distributed just as it has always been distributed among the water users.
Furthermore, the appellants have not shown how
the judgment will in this particular is any concern of
theirs, for they own no class B rights which might be
adversely affected.
VII.
The Costs
Appellants John E<lison and l\f rs. Tibbs complain
hecaus<:) the court awarded plaintiff judgment for costs
against them.
~'his
W<~re

was <lone no douht hecause these defendants

the only ]>nrtiPs to the action -..vho contesteil the

plaintiff's claim. It wm; apparent to tht) court from the
pleadings and from the procee<lings before the court that
but for the <lefense of these two defendants, the case
wonl<l Jmve gone m favor oi the plaintiff on his complaint without any contest. In fact, :Mrs. Tibbs was in
deiault and J olm 1£dison was hound by his disclaimer
until well along in the trial, when the court permitted
them to come in and defend on the ground that the Whittaker mortgage was void.
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The plaintiff prevailed against all defendants so
that he was entitled to his costs. (Section 104-44-2, Code.)
It was within the discretion of the court as to which of
the defendants should be requir·ed to pay them. (Section 104-44-4, Code.) No abuse of discretion is shown in
this respect.
We have answered all the criticism which have been
directed at the judgment in the plaintiff's favor.

It is respectfully submitted:
1. That the plaintiff's mortgage Is not void for
uncertainty in the description of the water right therein
mortgaged, just because the mortgage contains no description by metes and bounds or legal subdivisions of
the land upon which Richard H. Spencer used his water
right.

2. That the record and judgment in case No. 2888
is not void for uncertainty in the description of the mortgaged water right, nor for any other reason.
3. That the record in this case shows that the
plaintiff's mortgage takes priority over all claims of
all of the defendants in this action, except Que J ensen's, and hence that the decree properly forecloses all
such claims.
4.

That appellants are estopped by the mortgage,

by their pleadings in this case, and by the record and
judgment in case No. 2888 to assert that plaintiff's mortgage is void.
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5. That the validity of the Hadlock mortgage is res
adjudicata, having been decided in case No. 2888 to
which appellants were parties.
6. That there is no prejudicial error shown in this
record on appeal.
7. That the judgment appealed from does justice
and equity between the plaintiff on the one side and
all of the defendants, including appellants, on the other;
and hence the judgment in favor of the plaintiff should
in all respects be affililled.
8. That this respondent should be awarded his
costs on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
V. VERNON ERICKSON
DILWORTH WOOLLEY
Attorneys for Res1p,ondent

JAMES C. WHITTAKER.

